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sections of the Code.41 The Code is a statute designed to codify
the law of commercial transactions. Strict liability in tort-and it
bears repeating-is liability without fault, imposed by law on the
manufacturer for personal injury or physical damage to property
caused by its product.
At the least it seems safe to forecast that Corprew signals
stormy weather for privity in the near future. Currently, the case
can be limited to the abolition of the privity rule only where labeled
products are sold in sealed containers. With the proper set of facts,
however, the court might be convinced to impose strict liability
expressly on the manufacturer across the board since it is clear that
the theory does not provide automatic recovery for the consumer.
ROBERT A. WICKER
Trusts-Cy rres Enacted in North Carolina
The 1967 General Assembly enacted legislation giving North
Carolina courts power to use the doctrine of cy pres' in charitable
trust administration. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
long rejected the cy pres doctrine2 while upholding modification
"'In a California case which involved the UNIFORM SALES ACT, not
the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, the California court held that where
damages were sought for personal injuries no notice was required in an
action for breach of warranty. The court treated the potential liability as
non-contractual in nature and referred to it as strict liability. Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). See generally
Comment, Products Liability-Sales Warranties of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 46 N.C.L. REv. 451 (1968).
3The words "cy pres" are Anglo-French for "as near" and were orig-
inally part of the phrase "cy pres comme possible" meaning "as near as pos-
sible." The doctrine of cy pres gives to a court the power to alter the par-
ticular purpose of a charitable trust under certain circumstances. Where
the testator or settlor intended that the trust property be applied to some
particular purpose and yet also had a more general charitable intent, he
presumably would have desired that the property be applied to a purpose
"as near as possible" to the specific disposition chosen by him rather than
that the trust be allowed to fail. Therefore, if the particular purpose named
by the settler becomes impossible, illegal, or impracticable, the court will
exercise its cy pres powers to select a disposition similar to that named by the
settlor or testator. The cy pres doctrine is limited in its use to charitable
trusts and is widely accepted among United States jurisdictions. See G.
BOGERT, TRUSTS § 431 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; A.
SCOTT, TRUSTS § 399 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as SCOTT].
' As to the previous status of the cy pres doctrine in North Carolina, see
E, Fiscii, THE CY P'ns DQrTRINE IN TH UNITED STATES § 2 .03(g) (1950)
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of trust provisions under an equity court's general power to super-
vise trust administration. Because of new problems developing as
to charitable trusts, the cy pres power has become an increasingly
valuable tool of trust administration and public policy. This note will
analyze the 1967 legislation, fit it into the scheme of existing North
Carolina law, and forecast possible future applications of the cy pres
doctrine.
The 1967 Charitable Trusts Administration Act3 sets forth the
generally accepted requisites4 for a court's use of cy pres power:
1. the existence of a charitable trust, bequest, or devise;
2. impossibility, impracticability, or illegality of fulfilling the
settlor's particular intent;
3. a general, rather than specific, charitable intent by the settlor;
4. the absence of an alternative disposition provided by the
settlor.
Where these requirements are met, the court can order modifi-
cation of trust provisions to apply the trust fund or income "as
nearly as possible" to the disposition outlined by the settlor. Courts
must exercise discretion in selecting an alternative disposition;
nevertheless, a major limiting factor exists in the requirement that
the disposition selected closely approximate the settlor's intent as set
out in the trust instrument. Although the cy pres power can be ex-
ercised only by the court, some interested party or the Attorney
General must initiate an action ior application cy pres of trust funds.5
The language of the 1967 Act6 gives authority to the North Carolina
[hereinafter cited as FIscHr]; Note, 27 N.C.L. REv. 591 (1949); Note,
1 N.C.L. REV. 41 (1922).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-23.2 (Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as the 1967
Act]. For examples of similar statutes, see ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 145 (1958);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 196 (1957); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 2328 (1959).
See other cy pres statutes collected in SCOTT § 399 n.2.
The 1967 Act is based on the MODEL ACT CONCERNING TiHE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEVISES AND BEQUESTS, 9 UNIFORm LAWS
ANNO. 25 (1967).
'See BOGERT §§ 436-438; FISCH § 5.00; Peters, A Decade of Cy Pres,
39 TEMPLE L.Q. 256 (1966).
'The 1967 Act also deals with the troublesome question of which
charitable intent to follow where the settlor has designated an alternative
charitable disposition, but it also fails: the intention shown in the original
plan is to prevail. For a discussion of the effect of an alternative plan, see
BOGERT § 437.
'For an interpretation of the language of the 1967 Act, see [19671 N.C.
GEN, STAT. Comi!'w REP, item 10,
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courts to make needed changes in charitable trusts for the public
benefit yet protects the charitable intent of the trust's creator.
Prior to the 1967 Act, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
rejected the doctrine of cy pres whenever the question was raised,
basing this position on vintage decisions of questionable validity.
Despite a well-established judicial policy favoring charitable trusts
as well as a trend toward more court-ordered adjustment of both
private and charitable trust terms, the court failed specifically to
adopt the cy pres doctrine. This failure is all the less understandable
in light of a strong legislative policy favoring validity of charitable
trusts. As an alternative to cy pres power, the court has used its
equitable power over trust administration to produce results much
like those obtained in other jurisdictions under the cy pres doctrine.
Charitable trusts have been saved from failure in particular cases;
however, the decisions are unclear as to how far the courts can or
will go to avoid frustration of the settlor's charitable intent. A brief
survey of the salient case law and statutory development will demon-
strate the reasons for the 1967 Act.
North Carolina courts initially accepted the validity of charitable
trusts and jurisdiction over their administration in broad terms.7
This acceptance was followed by complete disavowal of the cy pres
doctrine." Early opinions failed to distinguish between prerogative
cy pres, which had been productive of abuse in England, and judicial
cy pres, which is limited by usual equitable rules.' The court feared
complete perversion of the settlor's intent under the cy pres doctrine.
Simultaneously, the rule developed that a charitable trust instrument
indefinite on its face as to objects or beneficiaries left too much dis-
cretion to the trustee and, therefore, was unenforcible. As a corol-
lary, the court held the doctrine of cy pres inapplicable to cure such a
deficiency, treating the doctrine as purely arbitrary and prerogative.
The rare use of judicial cy pres to remedy uncertainty in an at-
' Griffin v. Graham, 8 N.C. 96 (1820).
'McAuley v. Wilson, 16 N.C. 276 (1828).
'Bridges v. Pleasants, 39 N.C. 26 (1845); Holland v. Peck, 37 N.C. 255
(1842). For a discussion of the confusion between judicial and prerogative
cy pres, see BOGERT § 432; FiscH § 2 03(g).
" Taylor v. American Bible Soc'y, 42 N.C. 201 (1857); Bridges v.
Pleasants, 39 N.C. 26 (1845); Holland v. Peck, 37 N.C. 255 (1842). For a
discussion of the connection between cy pres and charitable trusts invalid
for definiteness, see BOGERT § 434.
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tempted charitable trust 1 further demonstrates the early courts'
failure to understand the doctrine.
These first cases firmly established the rule that courts in North
Carolina do not have cy pres powers. Thus, when a situation arose
for use of the cy pres doctrine, the court properly noted that the doc-
trine would allow the application of excess trust funds "as near as
may be" to the settlor's specific intent, but it declined so to order
because North Carolina courts do not have such power. 2 In later
cases where the cy pres issue has properly been urged upon the court,
it has been summarily rejected because it is "well settled" that cy
pres power does not exist in North Carolina courts.' 3 In other
cases, the court has discussed the application of the cy pres doctrine
and refused it where the doctrine would have no possible validity.14
Apparently, the merits of the cy pres doctrine have not been dis-
cussed by a North Carolina court since 1857, and thus it seems that
recent North Carolina judicial rejection of cy pres is based wholly
on stare decisis.
Even in the absence of cy pres power, however, the cases reveal
an increasing judicial willingness to modify specific provisions of
charitable trusts which would otherwise fail or prove ineffectual.' 5
Where trust funds prove inadequate to achieve the designated pur-
pose, the courts have consistently applied the fund as far as it will
go to carry out "the leading and primary intent of the testator."' 6
Fiscrr § 5.01(b); But cf. BOGERT § 434.
'
2 Trustees of Davidson College v. Chambers, 56 N.C. 253 (1859).
Where the trust fund was excessive for its purpose, the court refused to apply
the excess amount cy pres. There is some question as to whether a gift
to a particular college is made with general charitable intent. See BOGERT
§ 437.
1 See, e.g., Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 214 N.C. 224,
199 S.E. 30 (1938); Thomas v. Clay, 187 N.C. 778, 122 S.E. 852 (1924);
Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Ogburn, 181 N.C. 324, 107 S.E. 238
(1921).
"Lemmonds v. Peoples, 41 N.C. 137 (1848) (a private trust); Board
of Educ. v. Town of Wilson, 215 N.C. 216, 1 S.E.2d 544 (1929) (applica-
tion of tax funds to purposes designated by statute).
" This trend in North Carolina is in accord with a similar trend which
has developed throughout the United States and has led to the adoption of the
cy pres doctrine in many jurisdictions. Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine and
Changing Philosophies, 51 MIcH. L. Rnv. 375 (1953); Fisch, Judicial At-
titudes Towards the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 25 TEMPLE L.Q.
177 (1951).
" Paine v. Forney, 128 N.C. 237, 241, 38 S.E. 885, 886 (1901); Univer-
sity of North Carolina v. Gatling, 81 N.C. 508 (1879).
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Most jurisdictions hold that such facts call for the cy pres doctrine ;",
but, the North Carolina court has contended that its remedy does
not amount to the application of the cy pres rule because the fund is
applied to the "very purpose named" by the settlor and not to a pur-
pose "equally as good."' 8 The court departed from "the very purpose
named" in Trustees of Watts Hospital v. Board of Commissioners."
Increased hospital operational costs had made trust income inade-
quate. Therefore, the trust indenture was modified to allow con-
veyance of the hospital property to the county. This holding was
based upon the inherent power of an equity court "to modify the
terms of the trust to the extent necessary to preserve the trust estate
and to effectuate the primary purpose of the creator of the trust"
2 0
Language of this sort is normally used in other jurisdictions to
justify the application of cy pres powers.2 '
The North Carolina Supreme Court has also used the administra-
tive change concept22 to order sale of trust property where necessary
to avert failure of the trust or material impairment of its useful-
ness.23 In order "to give effect to the general intent expressed" by
the settlor, the trust corpus will be liquidated despite a trust pro-
vision forbidding its sale.24 The earlier cases provided that the sale
proceeds be used for the express purpose chosen by the settlor for the
original property. Implicitly, alteration of trust provisions was
"
7 BOGERT § 438.
" Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Ogburn, 181 N.C. 324, 328, 107 S.E.
238, 241 (1921).9 231 N.C. 604, 58 S.E.2d 696 (1950).
20 Id. at 615, 58 S.E.2d at 705.
" See, e.g., Noel v. Olds, 78 App. D.C. 155, 138 F.2d 581 (1943).
22 Cy pres power is more extensive than the ordinary power of the court
to permit deviation from the terms of a trust whether it be private or
charitable. The court under cy pres can order the application of trust prop-
erty to a charitable purpose other than that designated in the trust instru-
ment; however, this could not be done under the deviation or administra-
tive change rule. See ScoTT § 399.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has drawn no distinction between
charitable and private trusts in its use of the administrative change concept.
Compare Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 153
S.E.2d 449 (1967) (court-ordered sale of private trust property), with
Brooks v. Duckworth, 234 N.C. 549, 67 S.E.2d 752 (1951) (court-ordered
sale of charitable trust property). Nevertheless, using the administrative
change rule, the court has ordered the change of the particular purpose of a
charitable trust. Johnson v. Wagner, 219 N.C. 235, 13 S.E.2d 419 (1941).
28 Bond v. Tarboro, 217 N.C. 289, 7 S.E.2d 617 (1940); Holton v. Elliot,
193 N.C. 708, 138 S.E. 3 (1927); Ex Parte Wilds, 182 N.C. 704, 110 S.E. 57
(1921); Church v. Ange, 161 N.C. 315, 77 S.E. 239 (1913).
"'Brooks v. Duckworth, 234 N.C. 549, 67 S.E.2d 752 (1951).
[Vol. 461024
held permissible so long as the means, and not the settlor's desig-
nated ends, were changed. However, in Johnson v. Wagner2 5 the
court abandoned the "very purpose" requirement and applied the
cy pres doctrine without identifying it. Trust land impracticable
for its designated use as a religious assembly was sold and the pro-
ceeds dedicated to "other religious purposes" in accordance with the
terms of an entirely separate trust created by the settlor. In order-
ing this change of purpose, the court ascertained the settlor's gen-
eral charitable intent and directed the trust res to a similar but dif-
ferent purpose within that intent.
As the Johnson and Watts Hospital decisions demonstrate, the
North Carolina judiciary has become willing to modify specific
trust provisions where the trust has become impossible or imprac-
ticable.2" This judicial policy is completely in accord with the favored
position enjoyed by charitable trusts 7 in both case law and statute.
The North Carolina cases on charitable trusts are replete with ref-
erences to the rule that every effort should be made to save a trust
which is by definition beneficial to the public.2" A lone exception to
this general attitude has been the hostility of the courts to charitable
trusts with uncertain or indefinite dispositive provisions.
The 1925 General Assembly acted expressly to validate charitable
trusts with indefinite objects or discretionary powers of selection in
the trustee.2" The 1925 Act enables the trustor to give the trustee
2=219 N.C. 235, 13 S.E.2d 419 (1941).
For opinions where the court demonstrated its responsive attitude
toward the need to adjust trust terms by direct or implicit approval of plans
suggested by the trustees, see Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. McMullan,
229 N.C. 746, 51 S.E.2d 473 (1949) (trustees' plan to modify means and
time of trust income dispersal approved); West v. Lee, 224 N.C. 79, 29
S.E.2d 31 (1944) (court failed to comment on alternate application of funds
by trustees); Lassiter v. Jones, 215 N.C. 298, 1 S.E.2d 845 (1939) (alternate
plan for use of trust property, approved as proposed by trustees). See
also McKay v. Trustees of the Gen. Assem. of the Presby. Church, 228 N.C.
309, 45 S.E.2d 342 (1947) (dictum). The court found no impossibility of
the designated purpose, but indicated that the fund might have been applied
to a similar purpose had there been impossibility.
2'The public policy favoring charitable trusts is especially apparent
in their exemption from most federal, state, and local taxation. See FiscH
§ 4.02(b).
"8 Brooks v. Duckworth, 234 N.C. 549, 67 S.E.2d 752 (1951); Johnson
v. Wagner, 219 N.C. 235, 13 S.E.2d 419 (1941) ; Wachovia Bank and Trust
Co. v. Ogburn, 181 N.C. 324, 107 S.E. 238 (1921); Paine v. Forney, 128
N.C. 237, 38 S.E. 885 (1901); Keith v. Scales, 124 N.C. 497, 32 S.E. 809
(1899).
2' N.C. Gx. STAT. § 36-21 (1957) (hereinafter referred to in the text as
the 1925 Act).
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discretion to deal with unforeseen contingencies, thus reducing the
need for court intervention in charitable trust administration. There
was speculation that this legislation would lead to judicial adoption
of the cy pres doctrine.30 Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that if
the legislature deems it proper to grant a trustee discretionary powers
where a trust is indefinite, then the courts should exercise similar
powers where a trust's specific purpose has been frustrated but the
testator's general charitable intent is evident. The North Carolina
Supreme Court ignored this opportunity to adopt the cy pres rule
and proved its reluctance to abandon precedent by invalidating a
charitable trust for indefiniteness regardless of the 1925 Act."1 The
legislative response was a clear restatement of the public policy favor-
ing the validity of charitable trusts even though they be indefinite.32
In broadly construing the language of this subsequent legislation,
the court commented that the statute "will not permit us to misunder-
stand what the law-making power meant.".
3
The 1967 Act is properly viewed as the third step in a statutory
scheme insuring the validity of trusts having a general charitable
purpose. It is clear that the law-making power intends that the cy
pres doctrine be effectively employed by the courts. Now that a
strong legislative basis exists, the North Carolina Supreme Court
should reconsider the value of the cy pres doctrine for the first time
in over a century and adopt it as an important tool of trust admin-
istration. With such a conclusion to the long trend toward more
court-ordered modification of charitable trusts, predictability can be
established for a facet of charitable trust administration previously
characterized by the uncertain application of equity's general ad-
ministrative powers. The public interest in charitable trusts as well
as the settlor's interest in the effectuation of his charitable purpose
require that the courts act to save duly constituted charitable trusts
under a rule with clearly delineated guidelines such as those of the
cy pres doctrine as embodied in the 1967 Act.
Two subjects of current interest may soon call for the application
: See Note, 4 N.C.L. REv. 15 (1926).
"Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 214 N.C. 224, 199 S.E.
30 (1938) (funds to be paid out within 20 years by trustees to charitable
organizations of a designated class).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-23.1 (1957). For a discussion of this legislation,
see Note, 25 N.C.L. REv. 476 (1947).
"s Banner v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 266 N.C. 337, 340, 146 S.E.2d
89, 92 (1966).
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of the cy pres doctrine by the courts of North Carolina and other
states: federal regulation of charitable trusts and racially dis-
criminatory trusts 4
Charitable foundations (corporations) and trusts now play a
large role in the economy of the United States. 5 Alleged rampant
abuses perpetrated by donors, settlors and trustees acting under the
guise of charitable intent have precipitated proposals for federal
legislation to regulate these financial giants.36 Where trusts are in-
volved, the illegality of trust provisions which contravene federal
regulatory legislation and rulings may prove fertile ground for use
of cy pres powers by state courts. For example, regulations seriously
curtailing certain commercial activities involving trust property
37
might well impair a charitable trust's effectiveness to such an ex-
tent that court action to carry out the testator's intent as near as
possible would be required. The doctrine of cy pres might be used
to excise specific trust provisions illegal under federal law. Should a
federal regulatory agency 38 be created to supervise the financial ac-
tivities of charitable trusts, a partnership for the control of the
charitable giants may emerge comparable to that between the Se-
curities Exchange Commission and state courts for the control of
business corporations.
A recent United States Supreme Court decision indicates that a
charitable trust which performs functions "in the public domain" may
be held to violate the fourteenth amendment if it discriminates among
the races." Since the definition of a charitable trust requires that
it be beneficial to the general public,40 the presently expanding state
action concept may in the future subject many charitable trust activi-
",See Note, 40 N.C.L. REV. 308 (1962).
" See CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND
CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY (Comm. Print
1962) (Patman Report).
"Id.
See Krasnowiecki and Brodsky, Comment on the Patinan Report, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 190 (1963) ; Riecker, Foundations and the Patman Committee
Report, 63 MICH. L. REv. 95 (1964).
8 See articles cited supra note 37.
o Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). When a public park which was
trust property had previously been operated by the city, but had since come
under private trustee's control, the Court held that the park's mass recrea-
tional activities were plainly in the public domain and that the courts, under
the fourteenth amendment, could not aid private trustees in performing those
activities on a segregated basis.
"o See ScoTT & 368,
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ties to fourteenth amendment requirements. The courts often state
that charitable trusts perform services which would otherwise be
government responsibilities.4 1 Cy pres power could be used by state
courts to remove the offending provision or, if the trust be rendered
impossible by its illegality, to apply the fund to a similar non-dis-
criminatory purpose."
Using the doctrine of cy pres as suggested above, the state ju-
diciary can insure the continued existence of charitable trusts in
forms beneficial to the community while acting to control those fea-
tures of charitable trusts not in the public interest.
DAVID MCDANIEL MOORE II
"
1 See, e.g., Pierce v. Attwill, 234 Mass. 389, 125 N.E. 609 (1920).
"
2 See La Fond v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959)
(equally divided court). Where the bequest was to the city to establish a
white playground, four justices voted to apply the trust cy press for the
benefit of all children.
